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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax policy is broken in Washington, D.C. The recent “negotiations”
surrounding the “fiscal cliff” are merely the latest play in the long-running
theater starring the Democratic and Republican parties. In crude terms, the
Democratic position advocates tax increases and resists spending cuts to
address the growing inequality in America. The Republican position, in
contrast, resists tax increases because of concerns about economic growth
and advocates spending cuts to address the federal government’s exploding
national debt. The parties’ positions have become entrenched in recent
years, with politicians increasingly catering to the extreme wings of their
parties and eschewing compromise. We argue that one way to break the
impasse currently entangling tax policy is through pro-growth tax reform
that reduces both inequality and budget deficits. Although much maligned,
the estate tax is an ideal place to begin this effort because it can address
inequality concerns more efficiently than the income tax.
Part II of this Article summarizes the data that show that income and
wealth inequality has increased dramatically in the United States over the
past thirty years.1 It also reviews studies that demonstrate that we should
care about inequality because it contributes to a variety of adverse social
consequences that persist across generations.2 There is also substantial
empirical evidence that inequality has a long-term negative impact on
economic growth.3
Part III explores whether taxes can help to reduce inequality.4 Several
studies show that federal tax policy has played an important role in reducing
inequality.5 We argue that the estate tax is a particularly apt reform vehicle
because inherited assets are a major source of wealth among the rich, and
studies suggest that inherited wealth has a more deleterious impact on
economic growth than inequality caused by self-made wealth.6 Although
there are loopholes in the estate tax, it is still effective in moderating the
amount of wealth that is passed from generation to generation.7
Part IV examines the major criticism about the estate tax—that it
discourages savings.8 This part shows that standard tax theory cannot
predict the impact of the estate tax on savings and that the empirical
evidence is mixed. It also argues that the estate tax has a less harmful

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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impact on savings than the income tax for two reasons. First, the event that
triggers estate tax liability—death—is ignored by taxpayers during the
period of life in which they are likely to be most productive. Second, the
expected value of the estate tax’s effective rate is quite low during the period
of life in which most taxpayers create wealth. As a result, we propose that
Congress restore the wealth transfer tax exemption level ($3,500,000) and
top rate (45%) as in effect in 2009 and as proposed by President Obama in
his 2014 federal budget.
II. INEQUALITY MATTERS
A. Societal Effects of Inequality
As has been extensively chronicled elsewhere, it is indisputable that
there is growing income and wealth inequality in the United States.9 For
example, as shown in Chart 1, the Congressional Budget Office reports that
for the period 1979 to 2009, after-tax inflation-adjusted household income of
the top 1% of households grew 155%, the next 19% grew 58%, the middle
60% grew 37%, and the bottom 20% grew 45%.10

9. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2012); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME BETWEEN 1979 AND 2007, available
at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/10-25-HouseholdIncome.pdf; Thomas
Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1
(2003) (Mar. 2012 update available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2010.xls (2010 tables
and figures)); Jon Bakija, Adam Cole & Bradley T. Heim, Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners
and the Causes of Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data (Apr. 2012)
(unpublished article), available at http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/BakijaColeHeimJobs
IncomeGrowthTopEarners.pdf; Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes
in the United States (Updated with 2009 and 2010 Estimates) (Mar. 2, 2012) (unpublished article),
available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2010.pdf.
10. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME,
1979–2009, available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/Trends_in_
household_income_forposting.pdf; Chad Stone, Danilo Trisi & Arloc Sherman, A Guide to Statistics
on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Oct. 23,
2012), http://www.cbpp.org/ cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3629.
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CHART 1

Source: Congressional Budget Office, Trends in the Distribution of Household Income, 1979–2009

Similarly, Emmanuel Saez reports that, as shown in Table 1, a majority
of the income gains over the past eighteen years has been captured by the
top 1%.11 Over the entire period, 52% of the income gains went to the top
1%, who experienced 58% income growth (compared to 6.4% income
growth of the bottom 99%).12 During the Clinton (1993–2000) and Bush
(2002–2007) economic expansions, 45% and 65%, respectively, of the
income gains went to the top 1%.13 During the Obama economic recovery
(2007–2009) an astounding 93% of the income gains went to the top 1%.14
During the two economic recessions in this period (2000–2002, 2007–2009),
57% and 49%, respectively, of the income losses were borne by the top
1%.15

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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Saez, supra note 9, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
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TABLE 1
Real Income Growth by Groups, 1993–2010
Bottom 99%
Top 1%
Average
Incomes Real
Incomes Real
Income Real
Growth
Growth
Growth

% of Growth or
Loss Captured by
Top 1%

13.8%

58.0%

6.4%

52%

31.5%

98.7%

20.3%

45%

(11.7%)

(30.8%)

(6.5%)

57%

16.1%

61.8%

6.8%

65%

(17.4%)

(36.3%)

(11.6%)

49%

2.3%

11.6%

0.2%

93%

Source: Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Updated
with 2009 and 2010 Estimates) (Mar. 2012)

Edward N. Wolff documents the growing concentration of wealth in the
United States from 1983 to 2010 in Table 2.16 In these years, the share of
wealth of the top 20% rose from 82.3% (the sum of 33.8% plus 47.5% in
1983) to 88.9% (the sum of 35.4% plus 53.5% in 2010):

Year
1983
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010

TABLE 2
Distribution of Wealth, 1983-2010, Selected Years
Top 1%
Next 19%
Bottom 80%
33.8%
47.5%
18.7%
37.4%
46.2%
16.4%
37.2%
46.6%
16.2%
38.5%
45.4%
16.1%
38.1%
45.3%
16.6%
33.4%
51.0%
15.6%
34.3%
50.3%
15.3%
34.6%
50.5%
15.0%
35.4%
53.5%
11.1%

Source: Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle Class (Nov. 2012)

16. Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle Class 58 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18559, 2012), available at http://appam.confex.com/
appam/2012/webprogram/Paper2134.html.
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The concentration is more pronounced in the case of financial wealth
(excluding homes), as shown in Table 3.17 From 1983 to 2010, the share of
wealth of the top 20% rose from 91.3% to 95.3%:
TABLE 3
Distribution of Non-Home Wealth, 1983–2010, Selected Years
Year
Top 1%
Next 19%
Bottom 80%
1983
42.9%
48.4%
8.7%
1989
46.9%
46.5%
6.6%
1992
45.6%
46.7%
7.7%
1995
47.2%
45.9%
7.0%
1998
47.3%
43.6%
9.1%
2001
39.7%
51.5%
8.8%
2004
42.2%
50.3%
7.5%
2007
42.7%
50.3%
7.0%
2010
42.1%
53.3%
4.7%
Source: Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle Class (Nov. 2012)

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
also collects detailed data on income inequality across counties.18 In Divided
We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising, the OECD documents the
increasing income inequality in OECD counties, with the richest 10% in
these countries having average incomes approximately nine times that of the
poorest 10%.19 The United States has the fourth-highest inequality in the
OECD (after Chile, Mexico, and Turkey), rising 25% since 1980.20
As discussed extensively in a variety of sources, inequality has
significant adverse societal consequences.21 In The Spirit Level: Why
Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger,22 for example, Richard
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett argue that a variety of health and social

17. Id. at 11–12.
18. See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Income Distribution and Poverty at the OECD, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/social/inequality.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
19. Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising, Country
Note: United States, OECD, 22 (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/49170253.pdf
[hereinafter OECD, Divided We Stand]; see also Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty &
Emmanuel Saez, Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (2011).
20. OECD, Divided We Stand, supra note 19.
21. For reviews of this literature, see James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 836–49 (2001) [hereinafter Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth]; James R.
Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1150
(2008) [hereinafter Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity].
22. RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY
MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2009). Wilkinson and Pickett use as their measure of income
inequality the ratio of the income received by the richest twenty percent to the poorest twenty
percent. Id. at 17–18.
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problems (life expectancy, math and literacy, infant mortality, homicides,
imprisonment, teenage births, level of trust, obesity, mental illness
(including drug and alcohol addiction), and social mobility) are worse in
countries with greater income inequality.23 This is shown below:
CHART 2

Source: Richard Wilson & Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger
(2009).

Wilkinson and Pickett note that these adverse health and social problems
persist regardless of the level of average income (richer countries do not
achieve better outcomes).24 Moreover, they find similar results across the
fifty states in the United States.25 As shown in Chart 3, health and social
problems are strongly related to the level of income inequality in each state,
regardless of level of average income:26

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22; see also Richard G. Wilkinson & Kate E. Pickett, Income Inequality and Social
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CHART 3

Source: Richard Wilson & Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger
(2009).

B. Generational Effects of Inequality
The adverse effects of inequality are especially pernicious because they
persist across generations.27 Economists use an elasticity measure on a scale
of zero to one to measure intergenerational income mobility.28 An elasticity
of zero indicates that parents’ income is not at all related to their adult
children’s income, while an elasticity of one indicates that adult children end
up in exactly the same income class as their parents.29 A November 2012
Congressional Research Service report30 surveyed the economic literature
and concluded that “[e]mpirical analyses have estimated a strong positive
relationship—about 0.5—between parent and child income in the United
States.”31 This means that:
[I]f the income of a child’s parents was 30% higher than the average
income of families in the parents’ generation, then the child’s

Dysfunction, 35 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 493 (2009).
27. LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42400, THE U.S. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND
MOBILITY: TRENDS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R42400.pdf.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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income will be 15% above the average for his/her generation. In
other words, in the United States, about 50% of the (dis)advantage
of growing up in a (low) high income family may be inherited.32
Another recent study by the OECD measured the earnings intergenerational
elasticity for the United States to be 0.47.33 Other economists using a
different data set have found intergenerational earnings elasticity of 0.6,
suggesting that a family earning half the national average income could
expect to take five generations to reach the average income level.34
The strong intergenerational effect may be attributable to the health
issues that are associated with inequality discussed above. In addition,
inequality also impairs educational opportunities. Many have noted that the
children of lower income parents tend to perform more poorly in
standardized tests and to obtain lower levels of education than children of
higher income parents.35 Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott succinctly
summarized the studies when they stated:
The statistics are strikingly consistent. Children who grow up in
poor households are more likely to become teen mothers, to drop
out of high school, to accumulate fewer years of education, and to
perform worse on cognitive tests. Children whose parents did not
complete high school are much more likely to become dropouts
themselves. The adult children of the poor are more likely to be
unemployed as young adults and more likely to be on welfare.

32. Id.
33. Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth, OECD, 187
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/medios/44582910.pdf [hereinafter OECD,
Economic Policy].
34. See Daniel Aaronson & Bhashkar Mazumder, Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the
United States, 1940 to 2000, 43 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 139 (2008); Bhashkar Mazumder, The Apple
Falls Even Closer to the Tree than We Thought: New and Revised Estimates of the Intergenerational
Inheritance of Earnings, in UNEQUAL CHANCES: FAMILY BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS
(Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 2005); Bhashkar Mazumder, Is Intergenerational Economic Mobility
Lower Now than in the Past?, CHI. FED. LETTER, No. 297, 3 (Apr. 2012); see also Emily Beller &
Michael Hout, Intergenerational Social Mobility: The United States in Comparative Perspective, 16
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 19 (2006); Russell W. Rumberger, Education and the Reproduction of
Economic Inequality in the United States, 29 ECON. EDUC. REV. 246 (2010); Francisco H. G.
Ferreira & Michael Walton, Inequality of Opportunity and Economic Development (World Bank
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3816, Jan. 2006), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/
content/workingpaper/10.1596/18139450-3816.
35. See, e.g., OECD, Economic Policy, supra note 33, at 189–97; see also Repetti, Democracy,
Taxes, and Wealth, supra note 21, at 837–40 (summarizing the studies).
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Although there is significant controversy over the role of money in
causing these divergent outcomes, the correlation is strong and
widely acknowledged.36
C. Economic Effects of Inequality
1. Theory of Economic Effects of Inequality
Thirty years ago, most economists believed that a trade-off existed
between equity and efficiency. It was often said that “greater equality of
income can only be bought at the cost of lower productivity.”37 The
conventional view was that inequality should increase growth because (1)
the poor would be motivated to work harder; (2) the wealthy had a higher
marginal propensity to save than the poor; and (3) only the wealthy could
make the large capital commitment necessary for industrial growth.38
As discussed below, however, the long-term empirical studies
unanimously suggest that rather than help growth, inequality hurts long-term
growth. Several theories have been suggested to explain these empirical
results.39 Some have argued that nations with high concentrations of wealth
experience poor growth rates because such countries seek to redistribute
wealth by using progressive tax rates and taxing income from capital.40 The
theory is that the majority of voters will derive small amounts of income
from labor and capital, and, therefore, will favor higher tax rates on higher
amounts of income.41 The high tax rates will in turn discourage capital
investment and impair growth.42

36. BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 160 (1999).
37. Huw Lloyd-Ellis, On the Impact of Inequality on Productivity Growth in the Short and Long
Term: A Synthesis, 29 CAN. PUB. POL’Y (Supp.) S65, S65 (2003).
38. See Philippe Aghion, Eve Caroli & Cecilia García-Peñalosa, Inequality and Economic
Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1615, 1620 (1999)
(summarizing prior explanations for why inequality should be good for growth).
39. See Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, supra note 21, at 836–40, for an earlier and
more detailed review of these theories.
40. Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distribution, Political Conflict, and Economic Growth, in
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES 23, 34 (Alex Cukierman et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter
Alesina & Rodrik, Distribution]; Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and
Economic Growth, 109 Q.J. ECON. 465, 481 (1994) [hereinafter Alesina & Rodrik, Distributive
Politics]; Giuseppe Bertola, Factor Shares and Savings in Endogenous Growth, 83 AM. ECON. REV.
1184, 1184 (1993); Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 600, 607 (1994) [hereinafter Persson & Tabellini, Inequality]; Torsten Persson & Guido
Tabellini, Growth, Distribution and Politics 3, 11–14, in POLITICAL ECONOMY, GROWTH, AND
BUSINESS CYCLES, supra [hereinafter Persson & Tabellini, Growth].
41. See Alesina & Rodrik, Distributive Politics, supra note 40, at 476–78; Persson & Tabellini,
Inequality, supra note 40, at 604.
42. Alesina & Rodrik, Distributive Politics, supra note 40, at 476–78; Persson & Tabellini,
Inequality, supra note 40, at 604.
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This explanation initially seemed to be supported by the findings of
Alesina and Roderik that countries with high inequality have low investment
in capital as a percentage of their gross domestic product.43 However,
studies that included tax rates directly in their regression models found that
high tax rates do not play a negative role. Charles Garrison and Feng-Yao
Lee included sixty-three countries (forty-five low income and eighteen
industrial) in their study and found no support for the hypothesis that
increases in tax rates adversely affect economic activity.44 Similarly,
Roberto Perotti found no empirical evidence that taxes adversely affected
the growth rate of the sixty-seven countries in his sample.45 Using the
average marginal tax rate as the tax variable in his regression models, Perotti
found that the coefficient for tax was positive and highly significant,
suggesting that higher tax rates correlate with higher growth.46 There are
many potential explanations for these findings. Perotti suggests that they
indicate that the countries with higher tax rates are engaging in redistributive
policies that enhance social consensus and thereby increase productivity,47
or, alternatively, that such countries engage in policies that increase
investment in education.48 Not surprisingly, other studies have confirmed
that the impact of taxes cannot be studied in isolation. Instead, to determine
accurately the impact on growth, it is necessary to analyze both
governmental taxes and governmental expenditures because both can have
positive and negative effects.49
Other studies suggest that different sociopolitical and economic factors
contribute to the negative impact of inequality on growth. For example,
several have suggested that the failure of countries with inequality to invest

43. Alesina & Rodrik, Distribution, supra note 40, at 43.
44. Charles B. Garrison & Feng-Yao Lee, Taxation, Aggregate Activity and Economic Growth:
Further Cross-Country Evidence on Some Supply-Side Hypotheses, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 172, 172
(1992).
45. Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J.
ECON. GROWTH 149, 151 (1996) [hereinafter Perotti, Growth]. One study that has found statistical
support for the argument that higher taxes are responsible for slower growth in countries with
concentrated wealth, Reinhard Koester & Roger C. Kormendi, Taxation, Aggregate Activity and
Economic Growth: Cross-Country Evidence on Some Supply Side Hypothesis, 27 ECON. INQUIRY
367, 367 (1989), has been challenged as resulting from skewed data. See also Garrison & Lee,
supra note 44.
46. Perotti, Growth, supra note 45, at 170.
47. Id. at 171.
48. Roberto Perotti, Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution, and Growth, 60 REV. ECON.
STUD. 755, 775 (1993) [hereinafter Perotti, Political Equilibrium].
49. Richard Kneller, Michael F. Bleaney & Norman Gemmell, Fiscal Policy and Growth:
Evidence from OECD Countries, 74 J. PUB. ECON. 171, 188 (1999).

1265

06 CARONREPETTI SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/14/13 1:03 PM

adequately in providing educational opportunities is a factor.50 Others posit
that the presence of social unrest caused by inequality contributes to poor
economic growth.51 Moreover, the difficulty of enforcing property rights in
polarized societies also seems to be a mechanism through which inequality
hurts economic growth.52
2. The Long-Term Empirical Studies (Fifteen Years Through Thirtyfive Years)
There is substantial empirical evidence suggesting that inequality has a
long-term negative impact on economic growth.53 A 1999 survey of the
studies stated that “several studies have examined the impact of inequality
upon economic growth.
The picture they draw is impressively
unambiguous, since they all suggest that greater inequality reduces the rate
of growth.”54 As shown in Table 4, this relationship still holds today. All of
the empirical studies that have examined the impact of inequality on growth
in the long run suggest that high concentrations of wealth correlate with poor
economic performance.55 Because wealth is often difficult to measure, most
of the studies use concentrations of income as a proxy for wealth.56 Many
economists believe that this may not affect the results because
concentrations of income follow the same patterns as concentrations of
wealth,57 but a recent study has concluded—after examining data from
countries that collect data on both distributions of income and wealth—that
the distribution of wealth in those countries is more concentrated than the
distribution of income.58

50. See, e.g., Amparo Castelló & Rafael Doménech, Human Capital Inequality and Economic
Growth: Some New Evidence, 112 ECON. J. C187, C199 (2002) (when inequality is measured as
education attainment, inequality correlates with poor growth); Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, Income
Distribution and Macroeconomics, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 35, 35–51 (1993); Perotti, Growth, supra
note 45, at 152–53; Kevin Sylwester, Income Inequality, Education Expenditures and Growth, 63 J.
DEV. ECON. 379, 388 (2000).
51. See, e.g., Perotti, Growth, supra note 45, at 173–75 (finding that social and political
instability decrease economic growth); Carolyn B. Rodriguez, An Empirical Test of the
Institutionalist View on Income Inequality: Economic Growth within the United States, 59 AM. J.
ECON. & SOC. 303, 310–11 (2000) (asserting that inequality results in higher incidence of property
and violent crime).
52. Philip Keefer & Stephen Knack, Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between
Inequality and Growth, 111 PUB. CHOICE 127, 128 (2002).
53. For earlier discussions of this point see Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, supra note
21, at 831–40; Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity, supra note 21, at 1147–52.
54. Aghion, Caroli & García-Peñola, supra note 38, at 1617.
55. See infra Table 4.
56. See Aghion, Caroli & García-Peñola, supra note 38, at 1617.
57. Id. at 1617–18.
58. See, e.g., James B. Davies, Susanna Sandström, Anthony Shorrocks & Edward N. Wolff,
The World Distribution of Household Wealth 1, 7 (United Nations Univ. World Inst. for Dev’t Econ.
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TABLE 4
Author

Ghosh & Pal (2004)
Tanninen (1999)
Deininger & Squire (1998)
Knowles (2005)
Castello & Domenech (2002)
Alesina & Rodrik (1992)
Alesina & Rodrik (1994)
Birdsall, Ross & Sabot (1995)
Bourguignon (1999)
Deininger & Squire (1998)
Persson & Tabellini (1992)
Perotti (1996)
Chen (2003)
Keefer & Knack (2002)
Persson & Tabellini (1994)
Clarke (1995)
De la Croix & Doepke (2003)
Benjamin, Brandt & Giles
(2012)
Sukiassyn (2007)
Glyn & Miliband (1994)
Banjeree & Dulfo (2000)
Barro (2000)
Barro (2008)
Panizzza (2002)
Partridge (1997)
Thewissen (2012)
Bagchi (2012)
Banerjee & Dulfo (2000)
Brandolini & Rossi (1998)
Castello-Climent (2010)
Forbes (2000)
Li & Zou (1998)
Ravallion (1998)
Voitchovsky (2005)
Morck, Strangeland &Yeung
(2000)
Gangopadhyay &
Bhattacharyay (2012)

Time Period
between
Measure Date
of Inequality
and Growth
35
32
32
30
30
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
22
22
20
18
16
15

Negative
Correlation
between
Inequality
and Growth
X1
X
X
X
X2
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X3
X
X
X
X
X

15
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
3

X
X
X
X4
X4

X
X8
X9

X8
X9

0

X10

X10

Positive
Correlation
between
Inequality
and Growth

No
Relationship
between
Inequality
and Growth

X

X4
X4
X
X
X

X5
X
X

X6
X
X
X

Research, Working Paper No. 2008/03, 2008), available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/
rp2008/dp2008-03.pdf.
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Found a negative relationship between initial inequality and subsequent growth in rural states,
but found that inequality in urban states had no effect.
Inequality measured as inequality in human capital.
Found inverted U relationship. When income inequality is low, further redistribution hurts
economic growth. When initial income inequality is high, income redistribution enhances
economic growth.
Inequality hinders growth in poor countries, but helps growth in rich countries.
Inequality measured by concentration of billionaires.
Found that changes in inequality (decreases or increases) slow growth.
Found negative relationship using household data, but no relationship using county data.
Inequality at the top end of the distribution is positively associated with growth, while
inequality lower down the distribution is negatively related to subsequent growth.
Concentration of billionaires who inherited their wealth correlates negatively with economic
growth, but concentration of self-made billionaires concentrates positively with growth.
Inequality has complex wave-like relationship to growth.

In Table 4, all nineteen of the published studies that have examined the
relationship of high concentrations of income to economic growth at the
beginning of a period that extends fifteen years or longer have found that
high income concentration correlates with poor economic growth.59 For
example, Alesina and Rodrik found that growth rates in per capita gross

59. Alesina & Rodrik, Distributive Politics, supra note 40, at 481 (1994); Alesina & Rodrik,
Distribution, supra note 40, at 34; Dwayne Benjamin, Loren Brandt & John Giles, Did Higher
Inequality Impede Growth in Rural China?, 121 ECON. J. 1281, 1283 (2011); Nancy Birdsall, David
Ross & Richard Sabot, Inequality and Growth Reconsidered: Lessons from East Asia, 9 WORLD
BANK ECON. REV. 477, 496 (1995) (finding long-term relationship between inequality and growth
that is likely attributable to education); Francois Bourguignon, Growth, Distribution, and Human
Resources, in EN ROUTE TO MODERN GROWTH: LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1990s 43, 58 (Gustav
Ranis ed., 1994); Castelló & Dómenech, supra note 50, at C199 (when inequality is measured as
education attainment, inequality correlates with poor growth); George R.G. Clarke, More Evidence
on Income Distribution and Growth, 47 J. DEV. ECON. 403, 409–11; David De La Croix & Matthias
Doepke, Inequality and Growth: Why Differential Fertility Matters, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1091, 1109
(2003) (finding that inequality impairs long term growth and attributing this to inequality’s tendency
to increase fertility rates); Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, New Ways of Looking at Old Issues:
Inequality and Growth, 57 J. DEV. ECON. 259, 268–69 (1998); Keefer & Knack, supra note 52, at
146 (inequality hurts long term growth because of insecure property rights); Perotti, Growth, supra
note 45, at 159; Persson & Tabellini, Growth, supra note 40, at 11; Grigor Sukiassyan, Inequality
and Growth: What Does the Transition Economy Data Say?, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 35, 49 (2007);
Hannu Tanninen, Income Inequality, Government Expenditures and Growth, 31 APPLIED ECON.
1109, 1112 (1999); see Sugata Ghosh & Sarmistha Pal, The Effect of Inequality on Growth: Theory
and Evidence from the Indian States, 8 REV. DEV. ECON. 164, 175 (2004) (finding that inequality in
rural states adversely affected subsequent productivity growth, but that inequality in urban states had
no effect); Stephen Knowles, Inequality and Economic Growth: The Empirical Relationship
Reconsidered in the Light of Comparable Data, 41 J. DEV. STUD. 135, 151–52 (2005) (finding that
inequality, measured using expenditures by individuals, adversely affects economic growth in
sample consisting primarily of less developed countries).
In contrast, the results of studies that have used shorter time periods are mixed. For a survey
of the studies, see Lloyd-Ellis, supra note 37, at S66 (2003); Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and
Wealth, supra note 21, at 831–35. As discussed in Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, supra
note 21, at 836, and Lloyd-Ellis, supra note 37, at S77, it is likely that the long-term studies reflect a
more accurate picture because the factors that hurt productivity growth are most likely to manifest
themselves over a long period of time.
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domestic product for the period 1960 through 1985 in sixty-five countries
that are democracies correlated negatively with the portion of national
income earned by the top five percent and twenty percent of earners in
1960.60 The more concentrated income was in a small group, the lower the
growth rate in productivity. Another study by Persson and Tabellini of
eighty countries consisting of democracies and non-democracies found that
an unequal distribution of income at the beginning of a twenty-five year
period was “bad for growth in democracies,” while concentrated land
ownership at the start of the period was “bad for growth everywhere” during
the ensuing twenty-five years.61 A similar study of sixty-seven countries for
the period 1960 through 1985 also found that unequal income distribution at
the beginning of the period correlated with poor economic growth during the
twenty-five year period.62
Another study of nine European countries and the United States that
divided data from the years 1830 to 1985 into seven twenty-year periods and
one fifteen-year period (1970–1985) found that concentrated income
distribution at the start of each period correlated with poor economic growth
during that period.63 Similarly, a study found that income inequality in 1970
correlated with poor growth for the period of 1970 to 1988.64 Another study
used local panel data to examine the effect of inequality in rural villages in
China on income for the subsequent fifteen years for households in the
villages.65 The study found that higher inequality at the start of the fifteenyear period resulted in lower economic growth.66
One other long-term study has found a more complex relationship.
Chen, using cross-country data for a twenty-two-year period, found that
when income equality is low, further redistribution hurts economic growth.67
In contrast, however, when initial income inequality is high, income
redistribution enhances economic growth.68

60. Alesina & Rodrik, Distributive Politics, supra note 40.
61. Persson & Tabellini, Growth, supra note 40, at 18; see also Deininger & Squire, supra note
59, at 268–69 (finding that concentrated land ownership in 1960 correlated with poor economic
growth for the period 1960 to 1992).
62. Perotti, Growth, supra note 45.
63. Persson & Tabellini, Inequality, supra note 40, at 601, 607.
64. Clarke, supra note 59, at 403.
65. Benjamin, Brandt & Giles, supra note 59, at 1281.
66. Id. at 1294.
67. Been-Lon Chen, An Inverted-U Relationship Between Inequality and Long-Run Growth, 78
ECON. LETTERS 205, 206 (2003).
68. Id.
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Some of the foregoing studies have been criticized because they used
inconsistent or approximate measures for wealth distribution. Wealth
distribution can be approximated based on the distribution of pre-tax
income, after-tax income or consumption. Noting that many of the studies
had mixed the types of measurement, Knowles in a 2005 study used personal
consumption to measure the impact of inequality on growth over a thirtyyear period and also found a negative relationship in a sample of less
developed countries.69
3. The Short-Term Studies (Ten Years and Less)
Although the long-term studies have uniformly found a relationship
between inequality and poor growth, the results involving periods of ten
years or fewer have been quite contradictory. A study of sixteen industrial
nations found that nations with the greatest income inequality in 1980 tended
to have the lowest labor productivity growth during the ensuing ten years.70
Yet another study conducted by Barro, which used ten-year periods but
included different countries, concluded that initial high inequality at the start
of a ten-year period correlated with higher GDP growth during that ten-year
period for wealthy countries, but correlated with lower economic growth for
poor countries.71 In contrast, a study by Thewissen, which also used tenyear periods from 1970 to 2009 for OECD countries, found no relationship
between inequality and growth.72 The study used a different econometric
method for testing the relationship than that used in the previously discussed
Barro ten-year study.73

69. Id.
70. Andrew Glyn & David Miliband, Introduction, in PAYING FOR INEQUALITY: THE ECONOMIC
COST OF SOCIAL INJUSTICE (1994).
71. Robert J. Barro, Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries, 5 J. ECON. GROWTH 5, 18
(March 2000) [hereinafter Barro, Inequality]; see also Robert J. Barro, Inequality and Growth
Revisited 6 (Asian Dev’t Bank Working Paper Series on Reg’l Econ. Intergration, Working Paper
No. 11, Jan. 2008) [hereinafter Barro, Revisited]. Another study which used ten-year periods found
that changes in inequality (either positive or negative) correlate with slower growth. Abhijit
Banerjee & Esther Duflo, Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7793, June 2000).
72. Stefan H. Thewissen, Is It the Income Distribution or Redistribution that Affects Growth?,
11 (unpublished research memorandum, Leiden University Department of Economics, 2012.01,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2024856.
73. The study used the least squares dummy variable fixed effects method of estimation to test
the relationship using panel data. This method is used in order to avoid problems of heterogeneity
bias, that is unobserved variables correlating with the observed variables. Id. at 6–8; CHRISTOPHER
DOUGHERTY, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS 520–22 (4th ed. 2011). While this method reduces
the heterogeneity problem, it is more sensitive to measurement error than ordinary least squares. In
contrast, Barro used the three stage least squares regression method. Barro, Inequality, supra note
71, at 11.
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Some studies have started to use panel data for U.S. states to explore the
relationship between inequality and growth. An interesting study using
panel data was published by Mark D. Partridge.74 He tested whether
inequality in the forty-eight contiguous states affected economic growth by
comparing the level of income inequality at the start of a ten-year period
with the economic growth during that ten-year period for the forty-eight
states. He found that inequality was associated with greater growth, not
lesser growth.75 Interestingly, he also found, however, that the larger the
share of income by the middle quintile, the greater economic growth was
during the period.76 He suggests that these two seemingly contradictory
results might be reconciled by the fact that inequality creates economic
incentives to earn more while having a large middle class creates
socioeconomic benefits, such as stable social and economic environment,
that also increase growth.77 A subsequent study of fifty states in the U.S. for
periods of ten years by another economist, however, found no evidence of a
relationship between inequality and growth.78 The author noted that small
changes in the measure of inequality and the method used to regress the data
could result in the estimated relationship between inequality and growth for
this measure of time.79
Shorter time periods have also been contradictory. Using panel data for
five-year periods, Forbes found a positive correlation between the state of
inequality in the prior five-year period and the amount of growth in the
current five-year period.80 She noted that this might be the result of using
relatively short time periods.81 When she ran the same regressions for ten
years the results were statistically insignificant, although the sign was still
positive. Voitchovsky also examined five-year periods and found that
inequality at the top end of the distribution was positively associated with

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Mark D. Partridge, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 1019 (1997).
Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1030–31.
Ugo Panizza, Income Inequality and Economic Growth Evidence from American Data, 7 J.
ECON. GROWTH 25, 37 (2002).
79. Id.
80. Kristin Forbes, A Reassessment of the Relationship Between Inequality and Growth, 90 AM.
ECON. REV. 869, 872 (2000); see also Andrea Brandolini & Nicola Rossi, Income Distribution and
Growth in Industrial Countries, in INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND HIGH QUALITY GROWTH 69, 87–89
(V. Tanzi & K. Chu eds., 1998); Hongyi Li & Heng-Fu Zou, Income Inequality is Not Harmful for
Growth: Theory and Evidence, 2 REV. DEV. ECON. 318, 327 (1998).
81. Forbes, supra note 80, at 878.
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growth, while inequality lower down the distribution is negatively related to
subsequent growth.82
Ravallion has argued that the aggregation of data may hide the effect of
inequality in the short-term studies.83 He examined 6,651 farm households
in 131 counties in rural China and found a significant negative relationship
between the level of inequality in the county and the economic growth of the
household (measured in consumption).84 He found that the greater the
inequality at the start of a five-year period, the less the growth.85 Yet when
he ran regressions for inequality and growth in the county as a whole, he
found no relationship.86 He argues that the relationship between inequality
and growth may be nonlinear and as a result become lost in aggregation.87
Another source of controversy has been the measure of inequality. Most
of the studies discussed so far have used the Gini coefficient as the measure
of inequality. But this may be misleading. A 2012 study by Sutirtha Bagchi
used a different measure of inequality by comparing the amount of wealth
held by billionaires in a country to that country’s GDP.88 Using panel data
for five years, he found that the higher the concentration of wealth held by
billionaires, the lower the annual growth rate in GDP.89
Another study used another more refined measure of billionaire wealth.
Morck, Strangeland and Yeung examined whether inherited wealth has a
different impact than self-made wealth for a three-year period.90 They found
that a country’s per capita GDP grows faster compared to other countries at
a similar level of development if self-made billionaire wealth is a larger
fraction of a nation’s GDP and slower if inherited wealth is a larger fraction

82. Sarah Voitchovsky, Does the Profile of Income Inequality Matter for Economic Growth?:
Distinguishing Between the Effects of Inequality in Different Parts of the Income Distribution, 10 J.
ECON. GROWTH 273, 287–88 (2005). An even more complex relationship was found by Partha
Gangopadhyay and Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, Can there be a Wave-Like Association Between
Economic Growth and Inequality? Theory and Lessons for East Asia from the Middle East (Ctr. for
Econ. Studies and IFO Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3953, Oct. 2012) (finding
complex wave-like relationship between inequality and growth).
83. Martin Ravallion, Does Aggregation Hide the Harmful Effects of Inequality on Growth?, 61
ECON. LETTERS 73, 75–77 (1998).
84. Id. at 76.
85. Id. at 77.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Sutirtha Bagchi, Does Wealth Inequality Matter for Growth? A Look at the Uber Rich,
(2012) (unpublished student working paper, University of Michigan Ross School of Business),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2091834.
89. Id.
90. Randall Morck, David Stangeland & Bernard Yeung, Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control,
and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 310
(Randall Morck ed., 2000).
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of GDP.91 The authors suggest that slow growth results from inefficiencies
arising from entrenched corporate control by heirs, excessive capital market
power by heirs that can restrict access by others, and barriers against outside
investment.92
4. What is the Explanation for the Difference in the Long-Term and
Short-Term Studies?
There are two potential explanations for the difference between the
short-term and the long-term studies. First, different types of data are used.
Panel data is usually used in the short-term studies and cross-country data is
used for the long-term studies. Panel data consists of information on several
variables for several countries usually for a relatively short period of time.
In contrast, the long-term studies generally use cross-country data that
consists primarily of the measure of inequality for each country at the start
of the period and the growth rate for the country during a lengthy period of
time. One advantage of the panel data is that it helps reduce bias that may
arise from omitted variables. As Forbes explains:
[p]anel estimation controls for differences in time-variant,
unobservable country characteristics, thereby removing any bias
resulting from the correlation of these characteristics with the
explanatory variables. This technique does not adjust for omitted
variables that change over time, but papers estimating the . . .
growth model show that using panel estimation can significantly
change coefficient estimates.”93
Thus, the panel data may be providing a more accurate picture of the
relationship between inequality and growth.
The difficulty with this explanation, however, is that the short-term
studies are, to date, quite contradictory. As shown on Table 4, some shortterm studies suggest a positive correlation between inequality and growth,
others a negative relationship, and still others a more complex nonlinear
relationship where high inequality may be associated with slow growth in
some situations and high growth in others. The disparate results cast some
doubt on the notion that the panel data is providing a more accurate picture.
The simpler explanation for the contradictory short-term studies may be
that that the short-term studies fail to capture the true relationship between

91.
92.
93.

Id. at 327.
Id. at 362.
Forbes, supra note 80, at 872.
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inequality and poor growth because the relationship is not a short-term
relationship. As mentioned earlier, the long-term studies strongly challenge
the conventional textbook maxim that “inequality is good for incentives and,
therefore, good for growth.”94 The conventional wisdom was that inequality
should increase growth because (1) the wealthy had a higher marginal
propensity to save than the poor; (2) only the wealthy could make the large
capital commitment necessary for industrial growth; and (3) the poor would
be motivated to work harder.95 The long-term studies suggest that other
forces may be involved. The explanations with the most support—the
failure of countries with inequality to invest adequately in education,96 the
presence of social unrest,97 and the difficulty of enforcing property rights in
polarized societies98—are also the explanations most likely to manifest
themselves over a long period of time, not a short period.99 Indeed, LloydEllis has suggested that the short-term and long-term studies may not in fact
be contradictory.100 He argues that the incentive effect of inequality (that is,
inequality motivates low income individuals to work harder) may be the
dominant effect in the short term, while the other deleterious effects arising
from inadequate education and social unrest may dominate in the long run. 101
III. THE ROLE OF TAXES
A. Federal Taxes—In General
It is clear that taxes have played a role in equalizing wealth. For
example, the federal income tax reduced inequality by 8.47% in 1978 and
7.3% in 1998.102 A recent 2011 report by the Congressional Research
Service found that in 1996, federal taxes (income and payroll) reduced
income inequality by 5%.103 (Note that inclusion of the payroll taxes reduces

94. Aghion, Caroli & García-Peñalosa, supra note 38.
95. Id. at 1620.
96. See, e.g., Galor & Zeira, supra note 50, at 35–51; Perotti, Growth, supra note 45, at 152-53;
Sylwester, supra note 50, at 388.
97. See, e.g., Perotti, Growth, supra note 45, at 173–75 (finding that social and political
instability decrease economic growth); Carolyn B. Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 310–11 (asserting
that inequality results in higher incidence of property and violent crime).
98. Keefer & Knack, supra note 52, at 128.
99. See Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, supra note 21, at 836; Lloyd-Ellis, supra note
37, at S77.
100. Lloyd-Elis, supra note 37, at S77–78.
101. Id.
102. James Alm, Fitzroy Lee & Sally Wallace, How Fair? Changes In Federal Income Taxation
and The Distribution Of Income, 1978 to 1998, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 5, 16-17 (2005).
103. THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729, CHANGES IN THE
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG TAX FILERS BETWEEN 1996 AND 2006: THE ROLE OF LABOR
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the effectiveness of taxes in reducing inequality because the payroll taxes are
regressive.)104 In 2006, federal taxes reduced income inequality by slightly
less than 4%.105 This can be observed by examining the last row of the
following Table 5.106
TABLE 5
Share of Income Received and Taxes Paid by Tax Filers in Various Income Categories,
1996 and 2006
1996
2006
Before-Tax
After-Tax
Total
Before-Tax
After-Tax
Total
Income
Income
Taxes
Income
Income
Taxes
Bottom 20%
3.0
3.6
0.7
2.3
2.7
0.6
Second 20%
8.3
9.1
5.3
7.4
8.1
4.5
Middle 20%
13.7
14.2
12.0
12.1
12.7
9.9
Fourth 20%
21.2
21.4
20.0
18.9
19.3
17.6
Top 20%
54.0
51.6
62.0
59.3
57.2
67.3
Top 5%
29.0
27.1
35.6
35.0
33.5
40.9
Top 1%
15.4
13.9
20.2
20.5
19.5
24.4
Top 0.1%
6.6
5.8
9.4
9.7
9.1
11.8
Gini Coefficient
0.532
0.503
0.582
0.560
Source: Thomas L. Hungerford, Changes in the Distribution of income Among Tax Filers Between 1996
and 2006: The Role of Labor Income, Capital Income, and Tax Policy 7 (CRS 7-5700 2011)

Other studies have also shown that while federal taxes help to reduce
inequality in the United States, the impact of federal taxes on inequality has
been declining. In 2011, Olivier Bargain et al. examined the impact of
federal taxation during the period 1978 to 2009 and found that policy
changes implemented in 1982, 1987, and the early 2000s contributed to
inequality, while the reforms of the late 1970s, early 1990s, and 2009 made
income taxes more redistributive and reduced inequality.107 The study notes
that “[t]hese sub-periods can be broadly classified by Republican and

INCOME, CAPITAL INCOME, AND TAX POLICY 7 (2011).
104. Id. at 7–8.
105. Id. at 7.
106. In 1996, the Gini coefficient of before-tax income was 0.532 and taxes reduced it to 0.503—
a 5% reduction. In 2006, however, taxes reduced the Gini coefficient by less than 4% (from 0.582 to
0.560). The study concludes that taxes played a greater equalizing effect in 1996 than in 2006
because they were more progressive in 1996. Id. at 8. It is particularly interesting to note that while
the average tax rate declined for filers in the top 80% of income from 1996 to 2006, filers in the
lowest quintile (the bottom 20%) saw their average rate increase slightly from 5.24% to 5.68%. Id.
at 7–8. The average rate increased for the bottom quintile because of an increase in the average
payroll tax rate. Id. at 8.
107. Olivier Bargain et al., Tax Policy and Income Inequality in the U.S., 1978–2009: A
Decomposition Approach 17–18 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 5910, Aug.
2011), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ceswps/ _3402.html.
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Democrat administrations. Our counterfactual simulations also show that
during Republican administrations average tax rates fell strongest for high
income, but very little for low income households.”108 Similarly, a recent
study by Cooper, Lutz, and Palumbo of the Federal Reserve Bank also found
that federal taxes during the period 1944 to 2008 helped reduce inequality
for wage income, although such taxes have less of an effect currently than
they had previously.109
B. The Federal Wealth Transfer Tax
The impact of the federal wealth transfer tax has been somewhat
controversial for two reasons. First, it is not entirely clear what percentage
of national wealth is received through gifts and bequests versus having been
created by the taxpayer. As a result it is unclear what impact the wealth
transfer tax would have on inequality. Second, some have challenged the
efficacy of the Federal wealth transfer tax in taxing those transfers.
Inherited wealth constitutes a significant portion of wealth in the United
States. In 2012, 102 of The Forbes 400 Richest Americans were designated
as having inherited their wealth.110 In 1999, 149 of the Forbes 400 had
inherited their wealth.111 Economists estimate that anywhere from twenty
percent to eighty percent of the wealth in the United States has been
inherited.112 The differing amounts are attributable to disagreements about
which types of transfers should be counted and the use of different
databases.113

108. Id. at 19.
109. Daniel H. Cooper, Byron F. Lutz & Michael G. Palumbo, Quantifying the Role of Federal
and State Taxes in Mitigating Wage Inequality 17–18 (Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series Div. of
Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2012-5, Jan. 12,
2012), available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201205/201205pap.pdf.
110. The Forbes 400 Richest People in America, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2012), www.forbes.com/
forbes-400/#page:1_sort:0_direction:asc_search:_filter:All%20industries_filter:All%20states_filter:
Self-Made. The website designates the source of the wealth of 298 of the richest 400 as being selfmade, suggesting that the other 102 were given their wealth.
111. Dinesh D’Sousa, The Billionaire Next Store, FORBES, at 50 (Oct. 11, 1999),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1999/1011/6409050a.html.
112. See Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnell, Reassessing The Role For Wealth Transfer Taxes,
45 NAT’L TAX J. 119, 131 (1992) (finding that 52% of wealth is inherited); William G. Gale & John
Karl, Intergenerational Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 154
(1994) (finding that intergenerational transfers account for 51% of wealth when bequests are
included in the transferred amount); Lawrence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, The Role of
Intergenerational Transfers In Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. POL. ECON. 706 (1981)
(determining that 78% of wealth is received from parents). But see Franco Modigliani, The Role of
Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation of Wealth, 2 J. ECON. PERSP.
15 (1988) (arguing that only twenty percent is inherited).
113. For an analysis of the reasons that the estimates differ so greatly see Lawrence J. Kotlikoff,
Intergenerational Transfers and Savings, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 41 (1988).
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As discussed earlier, the large portion of inherited wealth may be
deleterious, since there is evidence that inequality attributable to inherited
wealth is more harmful than self-earned wealth. Morck, Strangeland, and
Yeung examined whether inherited wealth has a different impact than selfmade wealth for a three-year period.114 They found that a country’s per
capita GDP grows faster compared to other countries at a similar level of
development if self-made billionaire wealth is a larger fraction of a nation’s
GDP and slower if inherited billionaire wealth is a larger fraction of GDP.115
Given that large amounts of wealth are received through transfers, the
question becomes whether the federal wealth transfer tax is helping to
reduce inequality. We think that it is, because the federal wealth transfer tax
clearly reduces the amount of wealth transferred by the largest estates to
heirs. In a recent article, The Estate Tax Non-Gap, Why Repeal a
“Voluntary” Tax?,116 we showed that many of the assumptions underlying
George Cooper’s seminal work, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on
Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance,117 are no longer applicable. For
example, estate freezes that involve preferred stock recapitalizations can no
longer transfer untaxed value to heirs by failing to make dividend payments
on preferred stock held by the older generation.118 Unless the preferred stock
pays dividends, it is assigned a zero value, which means that the older
generation is treated as having made a taxable transfer of all the value in the
corporation.119 Similarly, qualified pension plans are no longer excluded
from a decedent’s gross estate.120 We concluded:
The result of these and other legislative changes since the
publication of Cooper’s article is that taxpayers now can reduce the
value of assets subject to transfer tax in many instances only if they
are willing to assume the risk that the reduction may be
economically real and reduce the actual value of assets transferred

114. Morck, Stangeland & Yeung, supra note 90, at 319.
115. Id. at 327.
116. Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap, Why Repeal a “Voluntary”
Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (2009).
117. George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (1977).
118. PAUL R. MCDANIEL, JAMES R. REPETTI & PAUL L. CARON, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER
TAXATION 767–71 (6th ed. 2009).
119. Id. at 767–68.
120. Id. at 333–34.

1277

06 CARONREPETTI SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/14/13 1:03 PM

to heirs or, alternatively, in narrow situations if they are willing to
incur some tax risk.121
The evidence suggests that the current estate tax is in fact contributing
to the breakup of large accumulations of wealth by encouraging charitable
contributions and imposing a significant tax burden.122 As shown in Table 6,
the largest estates transferred roughly one third of the gross estate to either
charities or the Federal government in the 2002 to 2011 period, even with
the increase in the exemption amount from $1 million to $5 million and the
decrease in the highest estate tax rate from fifty percent to thirty-five
percent.123

121. Caron & Repetti, supra note 116, at 161–62. Of course, others disagree with our
assessment. In this symposium and in other work, Edward J. McCaffery contends that the estate can
be easily eviscerated with a modicum of planning. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Distracted from
Distraction by Distraction: Reimagining Estate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1235 (2013); Edward
J. McCaffery, A Progressive’s Silver Linings Playbook: The Case for Repealing Stepped-Up Basis,
138 TAX NOTES 969 (Feb. 25, 2013); Edward J. McCaffery, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax
Reform, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 21 (2012); Edward J. McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax, Revisited,
NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROCEEDINGS 268 (2000). The data we present infra notes 122–26 demonstrates
the role that the estate tax is playing in curbing concentrations of wealth, which we discuss in greater
detail in Caron & Repetti, supra note 116, at 162–68.
122. See infra Table 6.
123. Authors’ calculations using data from INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS—ESTATE
TAX STATISTICS (2012), available at www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Estate-Tax-Statistics-FilingYear-Table-1.
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TABLE 6
Year

Size of
Gross Estate

2002
2002
2002
2003
2003
2003
2004
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
2009
2010
2010
2010
2011
2011
2011

$5 to 10 million
$10 to 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 to 10 million
$10 to 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million

Effective Estate Tax Rate
(Revenue as %
of Gross Estate)
16.64%
17.30%
12.35%
16.69%
16.68%
12.40%
16.76%
18.00%
13.47%
15.99%
17.56%
15.39%
15.23%
17.30%
15.57%
14.06%
17.30%
13.74%
12.96%
16.23%
13.72%
11.92%
15.13%
14.81%
8.93%
13.79%
13.33%
4.09%
8.21%
8.39%

Percent of Gross Estate
Contributed to Charity
7.40%
9.40%
22.30%
6.67%
8.92%
15.24%
6.76%
8.12%
17.62%
7.03%
8.51%
24.30%
6.05%
7.80%
17.83%
6.02%
6.53%
21.24%
5.94%
7.49%
27.27%
6.37%
6.96%
15.78%
5.38%
7.41%
14.50%
6.59%
11.94%
24.55%

Source: Authors’ calculations from Internal Revenue Serv., SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Statistics

Moreover, as shown in Table 7, below, the effective tax rate, measured
as a percentage of the net estate, was consistently quite high in the largest
estates, ranging from 35.08% to 43.99% in the 2002 to 2011 period.124
These numbers suggest that the tax is imposing a significant burden on
accumulated wealth. Indeed, if the tax were not imposing a burden, one
would have to wonder why eighteen wealthy families contributed nearly
$500 million dollars to bankroll a campaign to repeal the estate tax.125

124. See infra Table 7.
125. See Public Citizen, Spending Millions to Save Billions: The Campaign of the Super Wealthy
to Kill the Estate Tax, 8, 11 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished report), available at www.citizen.org/
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TABLE 7
Year

Size of Gross Estate

2002
2002
2002
2003
2003
2003
2004
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
2009
2010
2010
2010
2011
2011
2011

$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million
$5 – 10 million
$10 – 20 million
$20+ million

Effective Estate Tax Rate (Revenue as % of Taxable
Estate)
35.12%
39.50%
39.91%
32.99%
36.95%
38.06%
33.13%
38.00%
39.95%
31.76%
38.84%
42.94%
29.73%
38.06%
43.99%
26.09%
35.69%
42.67%
24.36%
34.10%
41.57%
23.07%
33.19%
41.55%
15.16%
27.62%
39.03%
6.92%
19.23%
35.08%

Source: Authors’ calculations from Internal Revenue Serv., SOI Tax Stats—Estate Tax Statistics

Thus, it appears that the estate tax is playing a significant role in
dispersing concentrations of wealth. The remaining issue is whether the
estate tax is economically efficient.126 As discussed below, we believe that it
is likely that the estate tax is more efficient than the income tax because it
has less impact on taxpayer behavior than the income tax.
III. THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ESTATE TAX
The major criticism of taxing wealth transfers is that it reduces social
welfare because it discourages savings. This criticism is important since, as
stated earlier, bequests and gifts account for twenty to eighty percent of all

documents/EstateTaxFinal.pdf.
126. See infra Part III.
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wealth accumulation in the United States.127 The difficulty is that this
criticism is not supported by theory or by the empirical evidence. Theory
does not predict the effect of a tax on savings, and the majority of the
statistical studies indicate that taxes have little or no impact.128
A. Theory
Theory proposes two opposite effects about how savings may respond to
taxes.129 The first, the income effect, occurs where taxpayers increase
savings to offset the effect of the tax. The second, the substitution effect,
occurs where taxpayers reduce savings and increase current consumption in
response to a tax. The result is that it is difficult to predict a priori what the
effect of a tax will be on savings and investment by the donors.130
In addition, a complete picture of the tax also requires analysis of the
impact of the receipt of the gift or bequest by the heir. Gale and Perozek
have developed a model indicating that in situations where transferors
reduce bequests in response to taxes, the transferees may increase savings to
offset the shortfall.131 Thus, even if the estate tax discourages savings by
donors, there may be an offsetting effect on heirs pursuant to which transfer
taxes encourage heirs to save more.132 They suggest that “estate tax changes
will typically generate opposing impacts on the donor and recipient,” and as
a result, not impact savings.133
The analysis is further complicated by uncertainty about what motivates
taxpayers to make bequests and gifts. There are several potential models

127. See Aaron & Munnell, supra note 112, at 131 (finding that fifty-two percent of wealth is
inherited); Gale & Karl, supra note 112, at 146; Kotlikoff & Summers, supra note 112, at 715, 721–
22 (determining that eighty-one percent of wealth is inherited). But see Modigliani, supra note 112,
at 36 (arguing that only thirty percent is inherited).
128. For earlier discussion and review of the literature on the theoretical effects in the estate tax
see James R. Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 1493, 1500–01 (2000)
[hereinafter Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax]; Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth,
supra note 21, at 858–60.
129. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim, Taxation and Saving (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7061, 1999) (“There is no theoretical presumption that either effect
dominates.”).
130. Id.
131. DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30600, ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXES: ECONOMIC ISSUES 10 (2009); William G. Gale & Maria G. Perozek, Do Estate
Taxes Reduce Saving?, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 216, 235 (William G. Gale et
al. eds., 2001); Michael D. Hurd, Mortality Risk and Bequests, ECONOMETRICA 779 (July 1989).
132. See Gale & Perozek, supra note 131, at 235–37.
133. Id.
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that likely apply to some taxpayers some of the time that can result in
differing impacts on savings. What follows is a brief summary of these
models and the proposed effects on savings that have been suggested by
Marples and Gravelle in a 2009 Congressional Research Service report
applying the model developed by Gale and Perozek.134
In the altruistic model, parents make bequests solely to help their
children.135 The effect of a transfer tax on the donors is ambiguous because
it is not clear whether the income or substitution effect will dominate.136 At
the same time, Marples and Gravelle suggest that the estate tax tends to
increase savings on the part of the recipient of the gift or bequest, apparently
because it reduces the amount they receive.137
In the accidental bequest model, taxpayers save for retirement and to
meet unexpected contingencies.138 Only unexpended amounts that remain
because of the uncertainties of life result in bequests.139 If bequests are
accidental, merely representing amounts left over because the decedent had
expected to live longer or because the decedent was saving for
contingencies, estate taxes will have minimal impact on savings by
parents,140 but again the heirs may increase their savings to counteract the
decrease in the amount they receive attributable to the tax.141
In the strategic bequest model, parents make bequests and gifts as
rewards for service obtained from their children.142 The impact of a tax on
parents making gifts or bequests is ambiguous because it will depend on
whether the parents will save more (the income effect) to make up for the
tax or instead substitute the services they had hoped to have received from
their children with services from others (the substitution effect).143 Marples
and Gravelle suggest that the estate tax will not affect the donors because the
transfer really represents a payment for services that would have been
subject to the income tax in any event.144
Another motivation for gifts and bequests may be the joy derived from
giving.145 Marples and Gravelle have suggested that, “If the parent focuses

134. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 131.
135. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82. J. POL. ECON. 1063 (1974).
136. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 131, at 10.
137. Id.
138. Gale & Karl, supra note 112; Hurd, supra note 131.
139. See Gale & Karl, supra note 112, at 147.
140. Bernheim, supra note 129, at 29–31.
141. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 131, at 10.
142. See, e.g., Douglas Bernheim, Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Strategic
Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1045 (1985).
143. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 131, at 10.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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on the before-tax bequest, the estate tax will have no effect on his or her
behavior, but will reduce the inheritance and theoretically increase the
saving of children.”146
Lastly it has been suggested that bequests and gifts are made because
the taxpayer has satiated all his or her consumption needs.147 In that case the
tax would have no impact on the donor. Moreover, Marples and Gravelle
argue that the tax may increase the savings of the recipients again to make
up for the reduction for the tax,148 or, alternatively, have no impact,
presumably because the needs of the heirs may already have been satiated.
After reviewing the various motives for bequests and the impact on
heirs, Marples and Gravelle suggest that there may in fact be “a tendency for
estate taxes to increase savings, not decrease it.”149 The following table
summarizes their analysis:
TABLE 8
Bequest Motive
Altruism
Accidental
Strategic
Joy of Giving
Satiation

Impact of Estate tax on Various Models for Donative Intent
Effect on Decedent Saving
Effect on Heir Saving
Ambiguous
Increases
None
Increases
Ambiguous
None
Ambiguous
Increases
Increases
Increases or None

Source: Donald J. Marples & Jane G. Gravelle, Estate and Gift Taxes: Economic Issues 10–11 (CRS 75700 Jan. 27, 2009).

B. Empirical Analysis
Only three studies have examined the effect of estate taxes directly.
Perhaps reflecting the theoretical ambiguity about the impact on savings, the
studies reach differing conclusions. In a 1966 study, Seymour Fiekowsky
found no evidence that the sharp increase in estate tax rates that occurred in
the 1930s and early 1940s resulted in a decrease in the size of estates.150
However, two more recent studies have found an impact. A 2000 study
by Kopczuk and Slemrod uncovered some evidence that the estate tax may

146. Id. at 11.
147. Id. at 9.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 10.
150. Seymour Fiekowsky, The Effect on Saving of the United States of Estate and Gift Tax, in
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (1966).
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affect the size of estates reported by decedents on their estate tax returns.151
The study’s findings suggest that taxpayers at age forty-five respond to an
estate tax rate of 50% by adjusting their reportable net worth in such a way
that the amount they will report at death is 10.5% less than what it would
have been without the tax.152
Another 2006 study by Joulfaian also found that the estate tax may
cause the size of reported bequests to be 9.4% smaller than they would be
without an estate tax.153 The Joulfaian study employed an interesting
methodology to analyze the estate tax effect. He converted the estate tax
burden on bequests into a comparable income tax burden by applying a tax
rate to the annual return on a taxpayer’s assets for the fifteen-year period
prior to the taxpayer’s death that results in the taxpayer possessing at death
the same amount of assets at death that she would have possessed after
application of the estate tax.154 He found that viewed this way, the estate tax
resulted in estates that were about 9.4% smaller than they would have been
without an estate tax.155 Interestingly, he also found that when he included
in his regression a variable for the estate tax itself, instead of the income tax
proxy, no relationship was evident.156
As Joulfaian, Kopczuk, and Slemrod observe, it is not clear whether
their observed impact is the result of actual dissaving by taxpayers or the
taxpayers’ use of valuation techniques designed to reduce the value of
reported assets.157 This decrease may be explained by the use of valuation
devices, such as family limited partnerships, which routinely result in
discounts in the reported value of assets by thirty percent.158 In an analogous
area, many studies of the effect of the income tax have found that highincome taxpayers do not reduce their economic income in response to
increased rates, but rather shift the income into tax-preferred forms.159

151. Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, The Impact of the Estate Tax on the Wealth
Accumulation and Avoidance Behavior of Donors (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7960, 2000).
152. Id.
153. David Joulfaian, The Behavioral Response of Wealth Accumulation to Estate Taxation: Time
Series Evidence, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 253, 266 (2006).
154. Id. at 255, 260, 262.
155. Id. at 266.
156. Id.
157. For descriptions of various techniques to reduce value see, for example, Laura E.
Cunningham, Remember the Alamo: The FLP, 96 TAX NOTES 1461 (2000); Alan L. Feld, The
Implications of Minority Interest and Stock Restrictions In Valuing Closely Held Shares, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 934 (1974); Mary L. Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal
Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 895 (1978).
158. See Cunningham, supra note 157, at 1464–65.
159. See, e.g., Alan Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 589, 632 (1997); Nada Eissa, Tax Reforms and Labor Supply, in 10 TAX
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Similarly, studies on the effect of tax incentives for savings found that such
incentives do not increase aggregate savings, but rather cause taxpayers to
switch saving into tax-favored vehicles (such as 401(k) plans) from taxable
investments.160
Indeed, most studies that have examined the effect of income taxes on
savings have found zero or minimal impact.161 After reviewing the failure of
taxpayer savings to respond to income tax rate changes in periods that
experienced significant rate changes—1981 and 1986—two authors
concluded that the “historical record seems quite clear in indicating little
effect on saving of the aftertax real interest rate.”162
There are strong arguments that a tax on wealth transfers should have
less of an impact than a tax on income.163 The estate tax differs from the
income tax in two significant ways. First, death, which is the triggering
event for the estate tax, is something that most people spend the majority of
their lives denying.164 Although the reasons for the denial of death are
debated,165 it seems widely accepted that we tend to ignore our mortality in
conducting our daily lives.166 The propensity to ignore our mortality may

POLICYY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120–35 (James M. Poterba ed., 1996); Joel Slemrod, The
Economics of Taxing The Rich, 27–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6584,
1998).
160. Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz, The Effects of Tax Based Saving
Incentives on Saving and Wealth 47 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5759,
1996); Auerbach & Slemrod, supra note 159.
161. See Alan Binder, Distribution Effects and the Aggregate Consumption Function, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 447, 471 (1975); Engen, Gale & Scholz, supra note 160, at 45–48 (tax incentives for savings
have little or no effect on saving); E. Philip Howrey & Saul H. Hymans, The Measurement and
Determination of Loanable Funds Saving, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 655 (1978);
Jonathan Skinner & Daniel Feenberg, The Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform on Personal Saving, in DO
TAXES MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1989); see also
Bernheim, supra note 129, at 47 (for an excellent survey of the studies).
162. Skinner & Feenberg, supra note 161, at 72. But see Michael Boskin, Taxation, Saving, and
the Rate of Interest, 86 J. POL. ECON. 53 (1978) (one of the few studies finding that income tax rates
impact saving).
163. For earlier presentations of these arguments see James R. Repetti, Entrepreneurs and the
Estate Tax, 84 TAX NOTES 1541, 1542–44 (1999) [hereinafter Repetti, Entrepreneurs and the Estate
Tax]; Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, supra note 128, at 1502–03.
164. See Repetti, Entrepreneurs and the Estate Tax, supra note 163, at 1542–44; Repetti, The
Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, supra note 128, at 1502.
165. See, e.g., S. Solomon, J. Greenberg & T. Pyszczynski, Terror Management Theory of Social
Behavior: The Psychological Functions of Self Esteem and Cultural World Views, in 24 ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 101–02 (1991).
166. See, e.g., AVERY D. WEISMAN, ON DYING AND DENYING: A PSYCHIATRIC STUDY OF
TERMINALITY 13 (1972) (stating, “[t]he primary paradox is that while man recognizes that death is
universal, he cannot imagine his own death. The belief is illogical, but persistent . . . . “); Sigmund

1285

06 CARONREPETTI SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/14/13 1:03 PM

mean that taxpayers also ignore the estate tax for a significant portion of
their lives. To prove this assertion, ask yourself if your decision to work or
make an investment today was influenced by the thought of your mortality.
Probably not. Also, how many businesses include the effective estate tax
rate in their yield calculations? We are not aware of any. In contrast, the
triggering event for the income tax, the recognition of taxable income, is
something on which most persons regularly focus. The result may be that
individuals respond more strongly to income tax changes than to estate tax
changes. As the great economist Joseph Pechman explained:
Opinions about death taxes vary greatly in a society relying on
private incentives for economic growth. Some believe that these
taxes hurt economic incentives, reduce saving, and undermine the
economic system. But even they would concede that death taxes
have less adverse effects on incentives than do income taxes of
equal yield. Income taxes reduce the return from effort and risk
taking as income is earned, whereas death taxes are paid only after a
lifetime of work and accumulation and are likely to be given less
weight by individuals in their work, saving, and investment
decisions.167
The second reason that the effect of a tax on wealth transfers may be
less harmful than a tax on income as it is realized is that, in any given year,
the expected value of the estate tax is a function of the probability of death
occurring in that year. This means that during taxpayers’ most productive
years, the effective estate tax rate is minimal.168 James Poterba explored this
in a paper that attempted “to place the estate tax in context, so that it could
be considered, along with taxes on interest, dividends and capital gains, as
an investor-level tax on capital income.”169 To calculate the estate tax’s
effective rate on capital income, he estimated the expected value of net
federal estate tax liabilities for taxpayers of different ages in the 1995
Survey of Consumer Finances.
The expected value was a function of the taxpayer dying during the year
based upon actuarial tables.170 He then divided the expected value of the tax

Freud, Thoughts For The Times On War And Death, in IV COLLECTED WORKS 288 (1915).
Economists have also noted that individuals tend to heavily discount future events. David I.
Laibson, Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobecman, Self-Control and Savings For Retirement, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 91, 92–93 (1998).
167. JOSEPH PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 225–226 (4th ed. 1983).
168. See Repetti, Entrepreneurs and the Estate Tax, supra note 177, at 1541–42; Repetti, The
Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, supra note 140, at 1502–03.
169. James Poterba, The Estate Tax and After-Tax Investment Returns 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 6337, 1997).
170. Id. at 12.
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liability by an estimate of the return on household net worth to calculate the
effective tax rate. Assuming an average annual real return of six percent, he
found the effective estate tax rate on capital income for persons in different
age groups to be as set forth in Table 9.
TABLE 9
Age of Household Head
Effective Federal Estate Tax Rate
A. Population Life Table
<50
50-59
60-69
70-79
>80

0.1%
0.3%
1.0%
2.7%
19.0%
B. Annuitant Mortality Table

<50
50-59
60-69
70-79
>80

0.1%
0.2%
0.5%
1.7%
13.9%

Source: James Poterba, The Estate Tax and After-Tax Investment Returns, Table 6 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6337, 1997).

Table 9 presents two sets of estimates. The first set is the estimated
effective tax rate for different age groups using actuarial statistics from the
Population Life Table, which is reported by the Social Security
Administration Office of the Actuary. The second set uses actuarial
statistics from the Individual Annuitant Life Table, which describes the
mortality experience of individuals who purchase single premium annuities
from life insurance companies. Poterba suggests that the probabilities in the
Annuitant Mortality Table may be more accurate for individuals likely to
pay an estate tax because that Table reflects life expectancies of individuals
affluent enough to purchase a single premium annuity.171
Note that using the Annuitant Mortality Table, the effective estate tax
rates are quite small for taxpayers under age seventy. The rates are .1% for
taxpayers under age fifty, .2% for taxpayers between ages fifty and sixty,
and .5% for taxpayers between ages sixty and sixty-nine. These figures
suggest that the failure of taxpayers to factor in the estate tax liability in their
younger years may be based on more than the irrational denial of death. It
may also be a reaction to the low expected value of the effective rates at the

171.

Id. at 14–15.
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time the taxpayers are generating wealth. The greatest distortive impact of
the estate tax would be on persons who are focusing on passing wealth to
their families upon their death at the same time that they are generating the
wealth. But, the number of these persons is likely to be small. Persons
generating wealth are likely to be under the age of seventy, and, therefore,
subject to a low effective estate tax rate.
It is interesting to note that Joulfaian172 measured the income tax
equivalent of the estate tax by looking at a fifteen-year period prior to death,
which he reported to be a weighted average of 81.7 years of age for his data
in 1998.173 As a result, Joulfaian was in effect examining the impact of the
income tax equivalent for taxpayers in their sixties, an age during which
Poterba’s study suggests taxpayers experience relatively low expected
effective estate tax rates. This may explain why Joulfaian’s results for the
impact of the estate tax, as opposed to the income tax equivalent, found no
impact.174
In summary, theory is ambiguous about whether an estate tax will affect
savings. The few empirical studies that examine the estate tax suggest that
the tax may cause the reported value of estates to decrease by about ten
percent. In contrast, the studies that have examined the effect of the income
tax on savings suggest no effect. There is a strong theoretical argument that
the estate tax should have much less of an impact on savings than the
income tax because of our psychological tendency to deny death and
because the expected value of the estate tax’s effective rate is small during
the period of life that taxpayers are creating wealth.
If the estate tax is to be used to help decrease inequality in America,
how should it be deployed? Our take on the political environment in
Washington, D.C.—now and for the forseeable future—is that attempts to
“go big” and pursue dramatic reform have little chance for success. The
push in this symposium and elsewhere for wholesale changes in the form of
inheritance
taxes,
wealth
taxes,
and
taxation
of
capital
gains/realization/carryover basis at death deserve more attention than they
are likely to receive by today’s lawmakers. Instead, we believe a “go small”
approach has the greatest chance for political success and would win a small
but significant battle in the long war against inequality in America.
Returning to the estate tax law in effect in 2009 (President Obama’s
previous position)—with a $3.5 million exemption and a 45% top rate—
would make a much-needed $72 billion down payment (over ten years).175

172. See supra text accompanying notes 168–71.
173. Joulfaian, supra note 153, at 261.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 170–71.
175. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FY 2014
REVENUE PROPOSALS 244 (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/
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Tax policy perfection must not be the enemy of the tax reform good that is
politically achievable.176
V. CONCLUSION
Inequality has been increasing in the United States. We should care
about this increase because inequality contributes to a variety of adverse
social consequences that persist across generations. There is also substantial
empirical evidence that inequality has a long-term negative impact on
economic growth.
For many decades, federal tax policy has played an important role in
reducing inequality, although the impact of federal taxes on inequality has
waxed and waned depending on the focus of elected officials. We argue that
the estate tax is a particularly apt vehicle to reduce inequality because
inheritances are a major source of wealth among the rich, and studies
suggest that inherited wealth has a more deleterious impact on economic
growth than inequality caused by self-made wealth. Although there are
loopholes in the estate tax, it is still effective in moderating the amount of
wealth that is passed within a family from generation to generation.
The major criticism about the estate tax—that it discourages savings—is
inaccurate. Standard tax theory cannot predict the impact of the estate tax
on savings and the empirical evidence is mixed. Moreover, the estate tax
has a less harmful impact on savings than the income tax for two reasons.
First, the event that triggers estate tax liability—death—is ignored by
taxpayers during the period of life in which they are likely to be most
productive. Second, the expected value of the estate tax’s effective rate is
quite low during the period of life in which most taxpayers create wealth.
Thus, a very strong case exists for returning the estate tax law to that in
effect in 2009 with a $3.5 million exemption and a 45% top rate.

Documents/General-Explanations-FY2014.pdf.
176. For other estate tax reform proposals, see for example, Jeffrey A. Cooper, Time for
Permanent Estate Tax Reform, 81 UMKC L. REV. 277 (2012); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable
Contributions in an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 263 (2007); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality
of Opportunity and the Charitable Deduction, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601 (2011); Phyllis C. Smith, Change
We Can’t Believe In or Afford: Why the Timing is Wrong to Reduce the Estate Tax for the Wealthiest
Americans, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 493 (2012).
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